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THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION AND ITS RELATION 




Suppose a person was just beginning an investigation of the subject of 
competition and he turned to the general catalogue of a large library. What 
could we safely assume would be his first imp.ression? The chances are over­
whelming that he would conclude that "competition" is primarily an economic 
term and that practically all of its serious investigation has been carried on by 
economists. Other scholars have, in fact, examined the term but, from the view­
point of a card catalogue, they appear as rare exceptions. 
An investigation, however, soon reveals that we live in a society where other 
types of competition are almost daily in evidence, obvious in so many different 
ways.+ Our political system with its electoral process frequently supplies 
examples of the most intense competition. Few of us can think of more appro­
priate alternatives for determining our leaders. How many of you would prefer 
inheritance as a selective mechanism for choosing our leaders rather than our 
present form of free elections with all of its short-comings? Our legal system 
with its advocacy system of law is clearly competitive in many of its aspects and, 
while it is far from ideal, there has been no mass movement to replace it by 
another. Even our method of choosing a mate has strong competitive elements 
whereby prospective suitors often vie with others, similarly motivated, for the 
attention, affection or marriage of some third person. So natural does this type 
of competition appear to us that vte can hardly conceive of workable alternative 
methods of selection. Yet for centuries courtship and marriage have been 
arranged in infancy by parents in Asia and with a high degree of apparent 
success. 
�Thus we can see that in addition to the economic sphere, competition is an 
important ingredient in our political system, our legal system, our method of 
courtship and in many other aspects of our daily life, but most of all in athletics. 
I have been asked to speak on the ethics of competition, particularly as it 
relates to problems in athletics. Such a request affords me the opportunity to 
discuss in some detail the meaning and implications of competition and, at the 
same time, to propagate my views on the nature of athletics . 
.f- Competition can be stimulating and challenging but when one's rivals are 
inventive and persistent, it usually involves detailed preparation. great effort and 
often disappointment and defeat. As a result many compete primarily out of 
necessity rather than from desire. For instance, powerful economic competitors, 
at times, may reach a point where they yearn for the peace and serenity of 
monopoly. As a result they secretly and deviously enter into practices which are 
condemned as price-fixing or other types of restraint of free trade. Lawyers, 
"'All future publication rights reserved by the author. 
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likewise, often see a court case as unnecessarily wasteful and thus seek out-of­
court settlements which they believe will better serve the cause of justice and 
pocketbooks of all concerned. In politics it is invariably the unknown or the 
underdog who cries for direct confrontations in the forum while the confident 
leader or incumbent seldom, if ever, is willing to debate the issues publicly. 
Even in our system of courtships, the contending suitors are often reluctant 
competitors and many deny that they would stoop so low as to compete for the 
affections of another. Some of the faint-hearted reluctantly choose solitude and 
loneliness rather than face the humiliation which a possible rejection magnifies 
in their minds. 
In everyday life men and women are often forced to compete, but in athletics 
they do so voluntarily and freely. Competition is an essential ingredient in 
athletics, never to be evaded by some alternative course of action. Both competi­
tors normally look forward to and savor the contest. Insofar as it is properly 
conducted, excellence is crowned by victory and the crestfallen loser dreams of 
and prepares for another tomorrow. 
Competition Defined 
Definition is always difficult. Seeking a definition, which will not only be 
applicable in economics but to all other areas of human life as well, is a most 
difficult undertaking. Consider, however, the remarkable similarity to be found 
in the definitions of competition offered by outstanding scholars in three 
different intellectual disciplines. John B. Clark, a noted economist has defined 
competition in this mannei: "Actual competition consists invariably in an effort -;;----,..,.___ to undersell a rival producer."1 In a somewhat broader anthropological context, 
Margaret Mead seems satisfied with the definition that "Competition is the act 
of seeking or endeavoring to gain what another is endeavoring to gain at the 
same time. "2 Arthur O. Lovejoy, Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins, did 
an even more thorough job. Lovejoy characterized competitioit· ". . . as an 
attempt to get or to keep any valuable thing either to the exclusion of others or 
in greater measure than others."31 Notice that in each of the three definitions 
there is a rival and an attempt to excel or overcome this rival. The only improve­
ment we can make in LOvejoy's excell��tanruysls"orcompetition is to add a 
brief qualifying phrase removing competition from the sphere of unbridled or 
criminal conflict. If we add to Lovejoy's definition the qualifying phrase, 
"Competition is an attempt (according to agreed-upon rules) to get or to keep 
any valuable thing either to the exclusion of others or in greater measure than 
others" we quite properly exclude from the sphere of competition, criminal 
activities such as burglary, embezzlement, strong-armed robbery and the like. 
It is both interesting and important to observe that each of the three 
definitions considered, if accepted, prevents a common misconception from 
occurring. Many people commonly speak of competing against themselves. But 
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a proper understanding o f  the nature of competition makes this impossible. 
This common misconception is often verbalized in this manner. "When I 
participate in tennis or golf, my primary objective is to improve upon my own 
past performance. Victory over my fellow participants is of little or no impor­
tance to me." If this is actually the case, and it may very well be, then the person 
voicing such sentiments is not actually competing. There are far more precise 
and accurate ways to describe his efforts. He is attempting to improve his skill, 
to learn, to develop, to grow, to actualize his potentialities. Only when he seeks 
to exceed, surpass, or go beyond the best efforts of others is he actually com­
peting. Competition in all of its forms always presupposes an other or· others. 
If the term competition is used promiscuously in everyday conversation to 
characterize everythiJ1g from types of conflict to general processes of growth and 
development, we are neither surprised or shocked by the ambiguity. This is par 
for the verbal course. Many commonly used terms like "sport,, have no more 
specificity. When, however an internationally known scholar in an important 
book fails to be more precise, we can be understandably disturbed. Georg 
Simmel, a highly regarded social theorist bas devoted the second chapter of an 
important work exclusively to the subject o f  competition and his investigation 
of this subject matter is disturbing. Simmel raises serious questions and doubts 
when he states that the foremost sociological characteristic of competition is 
that the "conflict in it is indirect.,, Linguistic usage, he informs us, reserves the 
term "competition" for conflicts which consist in parallel efforts by both parties 
concerning the same prize. 4 While this position confirms our earlier contention 
that competition always involves an other or others, his insistence that it con­
sists in parallel efforts by both pafrties would seem to almost rule out direct 
competition and to re-inf orce his contention that the foremost, sociological 
characteristic of competition is that the "conflict in it is indirect." 
He discusses two types of competition. In the first type, he tells us, where 
victory is the chronologically first necessity, in itself it (victory) means nothing. 
The goal of the whole action is attained only with the availability of a value, 
which does not depend on the competitive fight at all." Presumably the 
following would be a practical example of what Simmel had in mind. If I 
challenged several of you to a race and offered $100 to the winner, victory 
would be the chronologically first necessity and the $100 prize would be the 
goal of the competitors and its value would in no way be dependent upon the 
competitive fight. 
It is the second type of competition in which Simmel is most interested and 
which he believes to be of greater sociological value. "In the second type of 
competition, the struggle consists only in the fact that each competitor by 
himself aims at the goal without using his strength on the adversary . . . This 
type of competition equals all other kinds of conflict in emotional and passion­
ate effort. Yet from a superficial standpoint it proceeds as if there existed no 
7 
4
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 4 [1973], No. 1, Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol4/iss1/15
THE ETHICS OF COMPETITION 
adversary but only the aim."5 Simmel gives us three examples of this type of 
competition in which the competitor proceeds without using his strength on the 
adversary; indeed as if no adversary even existed. Simmel contends that we find 
such ideal indirect competition in the case of the religious proselytizer, who 
only by his zeal and sincere conviction, in the businessman who only by his 
attractive price, quality merchandise and good service, and in the runner who 
only by his swiftness, wins the victory. Such competition does, in fact, exist 
and may provide the greatest social value. 
Simmel's failure to treat of direct competition, however, clearly detracts 
from his study and raises serious questions concerning the depth of his under­
standing. Most competition does not consist in "parallel efforts" of the com­
petitors. The competition in economics, law, politics is often of a mosL direcL 
kind. In athletics it is only occasionally indirect. Even in the example which 
Simmel cites of the runner, the competition is usually far more direct than he 
believes. Only in the short dashes can it be said that "each competitor by him· 
self aims at the goal without using his strength on the adversary ... and that he 
proceeds as if there existed no adversary ... " In all middle distance and distance 
races the competitors are keenly aware of the existence of their competitors and 
usually, by the employment of their strength. and speed, attempt to get their 
opponent to run the type of race for which he is least qualified. 
Consider other athletic contests such as baseball, basketball, football, hockey, 
boxing, wrestling, tennis, etc. and we begin to question whether Simmers 
treatment of competition is adequate or only highly esoteric. 
While it is only conjecture, it would seem that Simmel's unexpressed 
attitude toward direct competition is best summarized by the psychoanalyst 
Ernest Van Den Haag: "Direct competition is illustrated by games like baseball 
or football. Each team tries not only to maximize its own score, but also to hold 
to a minimum the score of the opposing team. Each team attempts to reduce the 
achievement of the other by directly interfering with it. There is only a relative 
standard of achievement and no objective, independent one, such as time in a 
race, or total crop harvested. The extent of the defeat of one team is the mea­
sure of the achievement, the victory, of the other team. This is true also of box­
ing or chess matches. Achievement consists mainly in defeating the opponent, 
more than in attaining a goal in itself worthwhile. "6 
Van Den Haag does, however, acknowledge certain values in direct competi­
tion. "The psychological usefulness of competitive games lies both in cultivating 
and in absorbing some of our competitive spirit, channeling the need for 
superiority feeling into harmless outlets, and above all, in training us to pursue 
our aims according to rules that limit the harm we do to each other."7 
The Case Again st Competition 
In The Greening of America, Charles Reich considers the effects of competi­
tion upon the American character during the various stages of its historical 
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development and in each case finds it wanting. " ... There was another side to 
the American character-the harsh side of self-interest, competitiveness, suspi­
cion of othe·rs. Each individual would go it alone, refusing to trust his neighbors, 
seeing another man's advantage as his loss, seeing the world as a rat race with no 
rewards to losers. Underlying this attitude was the assumption that 'human 
nature' is fundamentally bad, and that a struggle against his fellow men is man's 
natural condition. 'There'll always be aggression and a struggle for power, 
and there'll always be a pecking order,' says Consciousness r.8 In Consciousness 
II, that created by the Corporate State, the same outlook prevails: Behind a 
facade of optimism, Consciousness II has a profoundly pessimistic view of man. 
It sees man in Hobbesian terms; human beings are by nature aggressive, com­
petitive, power-seeking; uncivilized man is a jungle beast."9 Consciousness III, 
not yet fully achieved, "is seeking to replace the infantile and destructive self­
seeking that we laud as 'competition' by a new capacity for working and liiving 
together. "10 
One does not have to indulge in the romantic meanderings of Reich in order 
to experience qualms concerning a competitive view of life. Can such a view be 
reconciled with the Golden Rule, can the spirit of profit and success be held 
simultaneously with the spirit of service? Is not self-interest d!irectly opposed to 
self-sacrifice? Such apprelhension is obviously not without some foundation 
when we are told bluntly by one of America's great economists, Frank K. 
Knight that: "It is in terms of power then, if at all, that competitive economics 
and the competitive view of life for which it must be largely accountable are to 
be justified. Whether we are to regard them as justified at all depends upon 
whether we are willing to accept an ethics of power as the basis of our world 
view ... "11 
Knight comes to this emphatic conclusion i n  a book entitled The Ethics of 
Competition, a book in which he raises a number of important questions. He 
inquires: "ls emulation as a motive ethically good or base? Is success in any sort 
of contest, as such, a noble objective?" Ashley Montagu, an anthropologist from 
Princeton, has a ready answer: "The first point I would make is that unless he 
is a gambler, no one should ever play any game in order to win. No one should 
ever particip.ate in any sport in order to win. I have no doubt that this will be 
a startling statement to many, but I do not make it in order to startle anyone. I 
make it as a sober statement calculated from the beginning of the discussion of 
the meaning and purpose of games to indicate what is wrong· with the attitude 
with which Americans enter into the playing of any game."12 If character 
development is related to ethics, Montagu attempts to justify this position in 
the concluding paragraph of the same chapter. "As Americans. we must make up 
our minds as to the kind of character we would like our citizens to have and to • 
do what is indicated to bring those characters into being, to recognize that a 
most important preparation for the game of life is the training one receives in 
playing the game in childhood and youth. We need to realize that the present 
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training we give our children through competitive games tends to bring out the 
worst rather than the best in them ... The old adage will always remain true: 
'It's not who wins that matters but how you play the game.' ,,ia 
Competition and Ethics 
1) The Ethical Neutrality of Competition Considered In Itself 
Competition in and of itself is neither a virtue nor. a vice. It can only be 
ethically evaluated in a concrete situation. Professor Knight errs grievously when 
he maintains that it can only be justified if we accept an ethics of power as the 
basis of our world view. Ashley Montagu reveals an abysmal ignorance of 
athletics when he argues that we should never strive to win, that winning is not 
important. Competition [provides a selective mechanism for assigning position, 
place, power, productive ability or physical excellence and until its detractors 
can offer an alternative mechanism that is practical and workable they can only 
be said to be over-reacting emotionally to many of the evils that do, in fact, 
follow in the wake of intense competition. 
Consider a common, practical example. Ten students are applying for ad­
mission to <>ne of our prestigious medical schools. The entire gamut of relevant 
personal qualifications of each candidate is carefully considered by a screening 
committee and finally one is selected. Few, if any, of the candidates may be 
aware of the meticulous efforts of the selection committee to choose the best 
possible candidate. Yet the very desire of each respective candidate to enter that 
medical school made him a competitor and while he may not have been aware of 
the extreme competitive nature of the selective process, this fact of life will 
eventually become clear to him. 
The same difficult question as to how a fair selection is to be made faces 
those who aspire to political office, or of lawyers who daily seek to win the 
approval of judge and jury, or, on the social level, of those who seek to win the 
affection of some popular and attractive member of the opposite sex. What 
alternative to the competitive principle would those who d!enlgrate It offer In 
the equitable resolution of such problems? 
There are few alternatives to competition as a social determinant of position, 
power or excellence. Historically the chief alternative has probably been some 
form of status, usually a rule of inheritance. Political preferment has also, at 
times, been employed but usually found sadly wanting. The chief danger to such 
methods of selection is that of suppression of personal development. Without a 
powerful stimulant such as competition human potentialities remain as such, 
,Potentialities which will never be actualized. 
Despite his stinging criticism of its ethical qualities, Frank Knight seems to 
concede that the competitive system in economics has produced an abundance 
of material goods at reasonable prices. Yet if this is so, we find ourselves con­
fronted with the curious paradox that the material welfare of this world is at 
10 
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war with essential morality. Rather than argue for cooperation as a workable 
aJtemative to achieve the greatest material advantage, Knight appeals to cooper­
ation on other grounds. He argues that happiness, self-realization and personal 
fulfillment, all basic goals of prominent ethical systems, depend less on material 
satisfaction than on spiritual resourcefulness and a joyous appreciation of the 
spiritual things of life, especially the affection for one's fellow creatures. "A 
strong argument for cooperation, if it would work, would be its tendency to 
teach people to like each other in a more positive sense than can ever be bred 
by participation in a contest-certainly in a contest in which the means of life, 
or of a decent life, are felt to be at stake." 
Whereas some isolated individuals and primitive societies may be relatively 
free from the competitive spirit, an over-all view reveals that competition appears 
to be an ineradicable trait of human nature. It is true that not all men compete 
with the same intensity. Some even tend to escape it whenever possible. Still it 
is difficult to see how any active person can escape all forms of competition for 
a single day. Competition being therefore an indisputable fact of Life, the real 
question is how to keep it within proper bounds. Men should be esteemed not 
because they abstain from competition, but because they hold in check that 
fierce desire for supremacy which threatens the observance of the agreed-upon 
rules which alone distinguish competition from internecine warfare of deceptive 
and destructive conflict. 
2) The Intensity ot Competition 
It is possible to place general limits upon the sphere in which competitive 
processes are socially beneficial if ,not absolutely necessary. When this selective 
process has performed its function, when it has answered the question who is 
best qualified for the job, who is the best contestant, who can produce the best 
product at the least cost, etc., then competition has served its purpose and there 
is little to be gained by its continuance. Where men have common interests it is 
only reasonable for them to cooperate rather than compete. In those cases where 
the interests of men are opposed, competition is usually the most equitable way 
of coping with the problem. 
There is another, and quite different aspect to the moral problem of competi­
tion. The moral level of competition is largely dependent on the conditions 
under which it takes place. The more intense the competitive drive, the more 
significance success carries with it, the greater will be the compulsion to tamper 
with the agreed-upon rules. Thus a highly developed competitive spirit may 
result in a whole host of moral ills which are inevitably or essentially connected 
with it. Deceit, lying, hypocrisy, etc., all too often do follow in the wake of an 
intense competitive spirit . 
.. 
Competition is often said to be in its very nature anti-social, a state of war 
instead of a state of peace, generating hostile p�ions in the place of sympathy 
and love. Open and declared opposition, however, is not the thing most likely to 
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give rise to hatred and jealousy. Where a conflict takes place under recognized 
rules and conditions which are observed by both parties, it does not necessarily 
give rise to bitter feelings. Bitterness arises when there is, or is believed to be, 
something unfair, some exception, some infractions of the rules resulting in un­
just discriminations. Open competition does not generate hostility. Rather it is 
among those removed from open and equal competition that hatred and 
jealousy are most rife. 
Competition and Sportsmanship 
In any discussion of "Sport and Ethics" it would seem that sportsmanship 
would become a crucial or pivotal point. Yet the term does not even appear in 
the index o f  Paul Weiss' book on Sport.14 Why? Was it consciously and delib­
erately rejected as of no importance? Or were its complexities and ambiguities 
too great to unravel? Was he simply being consistent in avoiding the ethical 
aspects of sport in their entirety? (except for one single indexed reference.) 
Whatever the reasons for Weiss' omission, sportsmanship has always had 
numerous champions who have made remarkable claims for it as a moral cate­
gory. Albert Camus, Nobel prize winner for literature in 1957 said that it was 
from sports that he learned all that he knew about ethics.15 Henry Steele 
Commager,. Profes.5or of History at Amherst College, argued that it was on the 
playing fields that Americans learned the lessons of courage and honor which 
distingu ished them in time of war. Commager concluded: "In one way or 
another, this code of sportsmanship had deeply influenced our national 
destiny."16 For Lyman Bryson of Columbia University, sportsmanship was o f  
extraordinary value: "It could be  established, I think, that the next best thing 
to the rule of love is the rule of sportsmanship. This virtue, without which 
democracy is impos.5ible and freedom uncertain has not yet been taken seriously 
enough in education. "1 7 
Sportsmanship, when not viewed as the pinnacle of moral perfection , can also 
be viewed as a moral minimum-one step this side of criminality. In the same 
vein, the term "poor sportsmanship" is sometimes used as a euphemism for 
criminal behavior. A recent example of such verbal tomfoolery can be found in 
the explanation of Commissioner Wayne Duke of the Big Ten Athletic Con­
ference concerning the assault and riot which intenupted the Minnesota-Ohio 
State basketball game laist year. In justifying the suspension of two of the 
players involved in the assault, Commissioner Duke said that they were sus­
pended for "unsportsmanlike conduct." 
It is precisely in difficulties of this type that our functional definitions 
demonstrate their practical value. The source of the confusion which vitiates 
most discussion of sportsmanship is the unwarranted assumption that athletics 
and truly playful activities are so similar in nature that a single code of conduct 
and similar participant attitudes are equally applicable to radically diverse 
12 
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activities. Not only is such an attempt doomed to failure, but a consequence of 
this abortive effort is the proliferation of various moral virtues under·the flag of 
sportsmanship, which, thus, loses all its distinctiven�. It is variously viewed as 
a straight road to moral perfection or an antidote to moral corruption. 
Now since I hold that athletics and play are two distinct species under the 
genus "sport" and that they are easily distinguishable and radically diverse types 
of human activity, I should be prepared to offer what I have characterized as 
functional definitions of each. First, consider athletics. Athletics are physical 
contests designed to determine human excellence through an honorable victory 
in a contest. Thus they are competitive by their very nature. Professional foot­
ball, baseball, basketball and hockey are excellent examples of athletic contests. 
So, also, are the various Olympic contests, intercollegiate and inter-scholastic 
contests. In fact, even most of the highly organized Little-league contests must 
be regarded as athletics. Play, on the other hand, is free, creative activity in 
which the goal of the participants is to maximize the joy of the moment, seeking 
no goal outside the activity itself. Good examples of this type of activity are 
"Sportsmanship" As Applied To Playful Activities 
In itself sportsmanship as it applies to genuine play is a spirit, an attitude, a 
manner or mode of interpreting an otherwise purely legal code. lts purpose is to 
protect and cultivate the festive mood proper to an activity whose primary 
purpose is amusement, pleasure, joy. The player adopts a cavalier attitude 
toward his personal rights under the code. He prefers to be magnanimous and 
self-sacrificing if, by such condu.ct, he contributes to the enjoyment of the 
game. 
Our insistence that the genuine player is primarily interested in maximizjng 
the pleasure or joy of the moment does not imply that he makes no effort to 
win the games which he enters. It is common practice for him, once the game is 
under way, to make a determined effort to win. However, spirited competitor 
which he appears to be, his goal is joy in the activity itself. Anything which 
makes the game itself less enjoyable should be eliminated. He "fights" to win 
because experience has taught him that a determined effort to overcome the 
obstacles which his particular game has constructed adds immeasurably to the 
enjoyment of the game. He would be cheating himself and robbing the other 
participants of intense pleasure if his efforts were only half-hearted. Yet there 
is an important sense in which playful activity is not competitive but rather CO· 
operative. Competition denotes the struggle of two parties for the same valued 
object and implies that, to the extent that one of the parties is successful in the 
struggle, he gains exclusive possession of the object at the expense of his fellow 
competitors. But the goal of playful activity, being the mutual enjoyment of the 
participants, cannot even lbe understood in terms of exclusive possession by one 
of the parties. Its simulated competitive atmosphere camouflages what is, at 
13 
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bottom, a highly cooperative endeavor to maximize the immediate pleasure or 
joy to be found in the activity itself. 
''Sportsmanship" In A th le tics 
Careful analysis has revealed that playful activity, while speaking the language 
of competition and constantly appearing in its livery, is fundamentally a co· 
operative venture. Its code for the "sportsman" (player) is directed fundamental· 
ly to facilitating the cooperative effort and removing all po�ible barriers to its 
development. Mutual generosity is a most fertile soil to cooperative activity. 
When we move from play to athletics, however, a drastic change takes place. 
Cooperation is no longer the goal. Competition now becomes the order of the 
day. The objective of the athlete demands exclusive possession. Two cannot 
share in the same victory unless they are teammates, and, as a result, the 
problems of competition are immediately in evidence. "Sportsmanship," in­
sofar as it connotes the behavior proper to the athlete, seeks to place certain 
basic limitations on the rigors of competition, just as continual efforts are 
being made to soften the impact of the competitive struggle in economics, 
politics, international relations, etc. But we must not lose sight of an important 
distinction. Competition in these real·life areas is condoned or encouraged to 
the extent that it contributes to the common good. It is not regarded as an end 
in itself but as the only or most practical means to socially desirable ends. 
Friedrich A .  Hayek, renowned economist and champion of competition in 
economics, supports this position. "The liberal argument in favor of making the 
best possible use of the forces of competition, as a means of coordinating human 
efforts . . is based on the conviction that, where effective competition can be 
created it is a better way of guiding individual efforts than any other. It does 
not deny, but even emphasizes that, in order that competition should work 
beneficially, a care·fully thought-out legal framework is required and that neither 
the existing nor the past legal rules are free from grave defects. Nor does it deny 
that, where it is impossible to create the conditions necessary to make competi· 
tion effective, we must resort to other methods of guiding economic activity." A 
code which seeks to mitigate the full force of the competitive conflict is also 
desirable in athletics. While the athlete is in essence a prizefighter, he seeks to 
demonstrate his excellence in a contest governed by rules which acknowledge 
human worth and dignity. 
For the athlete, being a good "sportsman" is most frequently demonstrated 
by the self-control he demonstrates in the face of adversity. A festive attitude 
is not called for; it is, in fact, often viewed as in bad taste. The purists or 
rigorists are of the opinion that a brief period of seclusion and mourning may 
be more appropriate. They know that for the real competitor, defeat 'in an 
important contest seems heartbreaking and nerve-shattering. The athlete who 
can control himself in such circumstances demonstrates remarkable equanimity. 
14 
11
Keating: The Ethics of Competition and its Relation to Some Moral Problems
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1973
JAMES KEATING 
To ask that he enter into the festive mood of the victory celebration is to request 
a Pa.gliacci-like performance. There is no need for phony displays of congratula­
tions. A simple handshake demonstrates that no personal ill-will is involved. No 
alibis or complaints are offered. No childish excuses about the judgment of 
officials or the natural conditions. No temper tantrums. To be a good loser 
under his code, the athlete need not be exactly gracious in defeat, but he must 
at least"be a man" about it. 
After an athlete has trained and sacrificed for weeks, after he has dreamed of 
victory and its fruits and litera11y exhausted himself physically and emotionally 
in its pursuit-after all this-to ask him to act with fairness in the contest, with 
modesty in victory and an admirable composure in defeat is to demand a great 
deal, and yet, this is the substance of the demand that "sportsmanship" makes 
upon the athlete-amateur or professional. 
The essence of "sportsmanship" as applied to athletics can be detennined by 
the application of one simple principle-the goal of an activity is the principle 
detennlnant of the conduct and attitudes proper to that activity. Honorable vic­
tory is the goal of the athlete, and, as a result, the code of the athlete demands 
that nothing be done before, during, or after the contest to cheapen or other­
wise detract from such a victory. Fairness or "fair play," the pivotal virtue in 
athletics, emphasizes the need for an Impartial and equal application of the 
rules if the victory is to signify, as it should, athletic excellence. Modesty in 
�ctory and a quiet composure in defeat testify to an admirable and extra­
ordinary self-control and, in general, dignify and enhance the goal of the 
athlete. 
Most of the moral problems' posed by athletics can be traced to one 
single source-its highly competitive nature. When competition becomes ex­
�ive in athletics, it almost invariably results in moral problems of one type or 
another. If, however, athletics are competitive by nature, at what point can the 
competition be said to be exces.sive? As might be expected, competition loses 
its social and moral value when it ceases to maintain its judicial role as the 
determinant of athletic superiority or excellence. This occurs when the desire to 
win becomes so excessive that it employs immoral means in the quest for 
victory. Some of these illicit means are hypocrisy, disregard for one's promises 
or the physical well-being of the fans and participants, incitement to riot, and 
The abridgement of one,s natural rights and freedom. 
Amateurism And Hypocrisy 
A careful study of the nature of athletics clearly indicates that the amateur 
ideal in today's socio-economic world is so impractical that adherence to this 
Victorian ideal encourages otherwise honorable men and women to all types of 
ludicrous posturing which can only be characterized as open hypocrisy. 
If the competitor is truly an athlete, if his desire is to excel on ever-increas-
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ing levels of competence, he must make the sacrifice of complete dedication. 
Such dedication requires great expenditures of time and effort which, in truth 
are very expensive commodities Thus, unless the young athlete is independently 
wealthy, he will come to see that if he is going to dedicate himself fully to 
athletics, then it will be necessary for him to earn his living in the process. As a 
result, the pursuit of excellence in athletics tends naturally and inevitably to 
some form of professionalism. 
In the recent past, the Olympic Games have provided us with international 
examples o f  pathetic or tragic cases in which unfortunate athletes, after being 
forced to sign the Olympic Oath, were rebuked for tampering with the amateur 
code. Those close to the Olympic scene knew for decades that there were many 
liberties taken with the Olympic Oath. Finally the explosion came in Mexico 
City in 1968 with the infamous track shoe scandal. There were pitiful pleas for 
information concerning payoffs from officials who were totally derelict in their 
duties if they were, in fact, ignorant of what was transpiring. There were threats 
of life suspensions and medal forfeitures. But the widespread nature of the fraud 
prevented any punitive action. In the end it was conservatively estimated that 
about 200 athletes were paid off. lf action had been taken, the U.S. would have 
been practically medal-less since it was reliably estimated that no more than five 
U.S. medal winners emerged with clean hands. 
Bill Toomey, the U.S. gold medalist in the decathalon summed up the 
matter. "It is time for athletes to take money and be open and honest or not to 
take it. The hypocrisy is what's killing us, not the money."18 
Hypocrisy is truly the chief culprit where amateurism is  concerned. In the 
winter OJympics of the same Olympiad, Marc Hodler, the president of the Inter­
national Ski Federation, fought in vain to get Avery Brundage to face up to this 
fact. After threats of their withdrawal or expulsion, the skiers were permitted to 
ski in the Olympic Games but only after Karl Schranz, generally conceded to be 
the world's best skier, had been barred as a concession to Brundage. Hadler 
argued the case for the world class skiers. " _ . .  I told Avery that if we could 
control the manufacturers' temptations by having them go legally through our 
national federations, we might do away with much of the hypocrisy that has 
plagued us. I told him that, with the federation's contracts, the manufacturers 
would feel secure that the boys would not run out on using their equipment. 
And if they felt secure they would stop spending all Sundays and Mondays after 
the races in pure bribery to guarantee that they would keep their racers on their 
products."19 
Thus it appears that because of Olympic Rule No. 26 which clearly states: 
"An amateur is one who participates and has always participated in a sport as 
an avocation without gain of any kind," European skiing, according to its own 
president, is shot through with hypocrisy and pure bribery. Perhaps U.S. 
skiers have been more faithful to the amateur ideal. "Hell, no" says Bob Lange, 
a highly successful Colorado manufacturer. "The only skiers on the whole FIS 
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circuit that I have to pay under the table are Americans. They deserve the 
dough as much as anyone else, but, by God, the only way to pay them is on the 
sly. Talk about hypocrisy. "20 
The American skiers themselves would seem to agree with Bob Lange's 
assessment. Spider Sabich, one of our fine amateur skiers who turned pro· 
fessional, said: "It was such a relief to stop as an amateur. I was fed up with the 
hypocrisy. Fed up with racing against guys who were making $50,000 a year, 
guys who had other people to wax their skis, sharpen their edges and who could 
go home when they got tired. I was too nervous trying to compete with what I 
thought were insufficient weapons. Now I have no worries."21 
Athletes and the Use of Drugs 
Wherever the intensity of the competitive spirit bums brightly as it always 
does in athletics, there will be a strong temptation to cheat. To the extent that 
any given drug promises to enhance an athlete's performance, he will be sorely 
tempted to try it. Before" however, we become emotionally involved in the 
athletic drug scene, we should honestly face up to certain questions. Does the 
average athlete promise not to use drugs before or during a contest? If so, are 
such drugs generally regarded by the medical profession as a threat to his 
physical well-being? Does the use of certain drugs demonstrably enhance an 
athlete's performance? 
If an athlete promises not to use certain drugs or is forbidden to do so by his 
school or conference, then he is openly in violation of the public trust, even 
though the drugs have no !beneficial effect upon his performance. If an athlete, 
in order to enhance his performance, uses drugs which the medical profession 
has pronounced dangerous or harmful, then his actions are highly suspect on 
the grounds that it is imprudent, if not irrational, to risk one's physical 
integrity merely for the purpose of performing well in an athletic contest. In 
the absence of any contrary promise or medical prohibition, an athlete uses a 
drug to enhance his performance, we are faced with the old moral problem of 
"drawing the line." Can he consume a$pirin or.alka-seltzer to cure a headache or 
an upset stomach in order to perform better? Can he drink coffee as a stimulant 
or beer as a depressant? Is there a basic ethical difference between taking a 
muscle-relaxer like valium whose side effects may not be fully known or giving 
anabolic steroids when both are done primarily in the attempt to help the 
athlete perform better? 
To the extent that the use of drugs in athletics constitute a major public 
health problem or threatens the physi�al integrity of the athlete who uses them, 
drugs pose a serious moral problem for athletics. To the extent, however, that 
the fruits of the phal'niaceutical science ate openly employed, without docu­
mented physical hazards, it is pure romanticism to suggest that the use of drugs 
destroys the very nature of athletic competition . To hold that "for sport to be 
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of interest, to have emotional impact, to be an artistic or commercia1 suceess, 
the contestants must be as equal as possible," is a myth of great magnitude. 
Athletic greatness is a triumph of carefully cultivated inequalities. The only 
equality required is that set by the rules governing the conduct of the contest. 
The appeal to horse racing with its emphasis on age, sex, past performance and 
handicapping with extra weight ignores the primary motive for such steps. The 
motive which calls forth such efforts in horse racing is clearly that of en­
couraging wagering on the contest-a motive presumably less important in 
competition between athletes. 
There is no doubt that, given their nature as prize fighters, athletes wilJ 
always be in search of secret drugs which will give them at least a temporary 
advantage over their competitors. Hal Conolly, a veteran of four U.S. Olympic 
teams, summarizes succinctly: "My experience tells me that an athlete will use 
any aid to improve his performance short of killing himself."22 
An important difference between athletic and nonathletic drugs can be made. 
An athlete takes many drugs that he would not take or be given if he were not 
an athlete. And the rationa1e for much athletic drug use is unique, for the drugs 
are not taken either with the intention or effect of improving or maintaining 
health, or to achieve a pleasurable sensation, but rather because the athlete or 
those around him believe he will perform better drugged than undrugged. Or the 
opposite could be the case. If organized gambling interests were involved, the 
temptation may even be stronger to administer drugs which would adversely 
affect performance. Administering drugs for this purpose is certainly as probable 
in horse racing as the attempt to enhance performance through drug usage. 
It is a question of motive that directly effects the morality of the athletic 
drug problem. Athletic integrity is clearly a matter of public interest. It is an 
accepted moral maxim that an athlete will do everything in his power, co· 
incident with the rules of the contest, to gain victory. If the use of certain 
drugs will predictably and adversely affect an athlete's performance, then they 
sho uld never be used unless accompanied by a pre·contest announcement. If, 
however, any food, exercise or drug not specifically banned by the rules is 
thought to be an aid in enhancing an athlete's performance, it clearly falls within 
the bounds of the morally acceptable. The quest for some miracle drug could 
conceivably result in the unfortunate situation that the winners will not be the 
best athletes naturally, but the richest, those with the best pharmaceutical 
resources at their disposal. Such a possibility, however, is so remote that it can 
cause no legitimate moral concern today. 
If too much competition can be a bad thing, it is also true that the absence of 
competition can also have serious adverse effects. Baseball's "reserve clause" is a 
good case in point. After Curt Flood had been "sold" or traded to Philadelphia 
by the St. Louis Cardinals, he decided to test such unique employment practices 
in the courts. His first step was to appeal to the commissioner of baseball, Mr. 
Bowie Kuhn in the following words. "After 12 years in the major leagues, I do 
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not feel that I am a piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my 
wishes. I believe that any system which violates my basic rights as a citizen is 
inconsistent with the laws of the U.S. and of the several states." 
Mr. Kuhn was not moved by this argument, however, and Flood•s case went 
through all available legal channels until it reached the Supreme Court. On 
June 19, 1972 the Court ruled by a vote of 5 to 3 in favor of lhe "reserve 
clause" and against Curt Flood. While recognizing the facl that other "sports" 
have been more sharply restricted, as a result of various judicial decisions, in 
their control of player personnel, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing the 
majority decision, admitted the inconsistency, but refused to strike down the 
"reserve clause" as unconstitutional. He pointed to Congress as the proper place 
for redress. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that when the Court's "errors deny sub­
stantially federal rights, like the right to compete freely and effectively to the 
best of one's ability we must admit our error and correct it." There would 
appear to be a form of serfdom involved here under which baseball players a.re 
bought and sold. And although the court does not say so, this archaic arrange· 
ment does not appear to be in conflict with the constitutional provisions against 
slavery since the performer can always quit-giving up his only precious and 
highly marketable talent-and tum to a type of work for which he is far less 
suited. 
While professional football would appear to be far more liberal, the football 
draft requires that a player go to a city which drafted him despite the incon­
venience and hardship it may cause his family. His only alternatives are to skip 
to the Canadian league or to give up that type of employment for which he is 
best qualified and which is most lucrative. Once signed it is true that technically 
a football player can become a free agent by playing out his option, but he is 
never free to sign with a new team simply by negotiating with it. His freedom, 
even after h.is option has expired, is dependent upon the exchange of a player 
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